The Privacy Shield agreement approving the transfer of non-public knowledge from the EU to the US. He is dead, or at least that is the POSITION of the EU, which the Court declared legally invalid last week. The initial reaction of the U.S. Department of Commerce was to stand behind the shield. As is the case in the divorce, only one party sought to faint.
This is the kind of rupture scenario that can get complicated. If things aren’t well managed, we can take a look at some other scenario in War Of The Roses (such as Michael Douglas and Kathleen Turner, not Lancaster and York Houses), where profits and profits have been learned gradually and gradually over time during the mutual The benefits of either party are quickly lost, due to the failure of mutual concessions.
By rejecting the knowledge-covering shield, the EU rejected its own offspring. And he has done so twice, regarding the transfer of non-public knowledge to the United States. The first time in 2015, when he abandoned the elder brother of the knowledge cover shield, Safe Harbor. What’s going on?
What we’re seeing is a vintage disconnect between political ambitions.
On the one hand, the EU has a political ambition in its human rights schedule. As a result, it has followed the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) and other previous laws to bring this calendar to life in the context of knowledge processing activities. Due to the main ideals of this calendar, the EU is legally committed to meeting its knowledge coverage criteria for all non-public knowledge of European origin, anywhere in the world where it is discovered. It is simple to perceive where the EU comes from.
This is where the upheaval begins, however, because the EU is sovereign only within its borders. The law of other sovereign nations is not a matter for the EU, when treaties or other remedies under foreign law say otherwise. With respect to national security, public protection, and law enforcement disorders in the United States, they are obviously a matter for the United States.
On the one hand, there are political paintings to be made. It’s about keeping the knowledge flows and paintings of the global economy moving.
European politicians perceive such unrest and are as versed in realpolitik as other politicians. It is a realpolitik mentality that has led to the creation of the knowledge coverage shield.
The knowledge coverage shield was the compromise, deliberately, and everyone knew it, however, it was as productive as the parties around the negotiating table can propose at that time, in the cases they faced, including the preference to avoid making demands. demands for the decline of sovereign positions. Politicians versed in realpolitik know that sovereignty problems can be red-line problems and withdraw things for sovereign nations. See Brexit for additional evidence of what can happen when commitment to sovereignty issues fails.
Judges can also be politicians. They may have been politicians in Privacy Shield, offering a rest of the EU’s popular contractual clauses, to keep them at stake for knowledge transfers to the Us. We’ll probably never know the answers to all the questions. is derived from last week’s trial, but in any case, the starting point for judges to interpret the law based on what it says and what it means. When they did this for the GDPR and its effects on the knowledge coverage shield, the judges concluded that the two legal tools cannot be reconciled either.
In this polar, the tracks are not hidden and their meaning is not disguised. Europe’s political ambition to achieve its highest human rights ideals for non-public European knowledge, wherever it is possibly in the world, has been fulfilled with its political ambition to commit to harmonious operations on the global stage. GDPR is a superior ideal. Knowledge coverage protects a commitment. The GDPR killed the shield.
The EU’s assassination of its own commitment means that we have returned to the starting point, with conflicting sovereign positions. There are many revisions to what to do next, in which there is a small but noisy refrain in Europe that says the only way out of the deadlock is for the United States to go back and replace its laws, with the risk of a ban. If not, the transfer of knowledge is because the EU will not replace its laws.
This kind of mindset doesn’t solve the genuine problem. The EU cannot order the US to replace its laws, and it knows it. America still has the hand of the whip. A highly conflicting technique for resolving existing disorders will not be of anyone’s interest.
It is therefore best to avoid a very hasty and quick reaction to last week’s decision, which is included in some parts of the EU regulatory community, which has been tarnished by the Court of Justice. The European Data Protection Committee, which is composed of knowledge coverage regulators of EU Member States and officials of EU institutions, showed in its initial reaction to the decision that it will play a constructive role in securing transatlantic knowledge flows. The UK regulator has made its preference to maintain global knowledge flows transparent.
Some German regulators seem to take another position. The view in Berlin is that the flows of knowledge to the United States deserve to be stopped. The Hamburg regulator foresys “difficult times” for foreign knowledge flows, while it envisages that the Court has responded to popular contractual clauses. It’s simple to see where this is going.
If a clash of confidentiality with the United States is not giant enough, Berlin and Hamburg also imply that there may be clashes with other geopolitical and economic powers. China, Russia and India were named. The UK is also reported.
However, there is virtually no chance that the EU will prohibit knowledge flows to the US, China, Russia, India and the UK (and there are many other countries that can be added to a list of those that do not, or possibly not) seeing things about privacy and knowledge coverage precisely in the form of the EU). The EU has no preference for isolating itself from the rest of the world or blocking its economy.
On the other hand, if there are to be global privacy disputes, they are more likely to occur between EU Member States and individual corporations not eu-based. Regulators, such as the Data Protection Commissioner in Ireland and those in Berlin and Hamburg, will have the opportunity to make their mark, as the EU Court of Justice has asked them to do so. The very important decisions will depend on a few Americans and we will see how far they will go in the objective of the continuous coverage of non-public knowledge of European origin and at what cost.
Perhaps, as the UK recently did with Huawei (with respect to Huawei’s role in the UK’s telecommunications infrastructure), some EU Member States will be ready to take unique action opposed to secure US corporations for privacy and knowledge coverage reasons. From there, it can happen, but the greater the interruption of the economic interests of the other party, the greater the chances and dangers of reimbursement.
High ideals and realpolitik would possibly support conflict, however, incentives to commit to a messy divorce from privacy are enormous, giving hope for the future.
I am global knowledge coverage and cyber security manager at DWF Law LLP. I have 20 years of pleasure in those areas, adding as a world leader in legal services
I am global knowledge coverage and cyber security manager at DWF Law LLP. I have 20 years of pleasure in those areas, adding as a world leader in legal affairs at a firm of the big four.